In a continuing rant about the evils of the USA Patriot Act. Here's part two
of a critique by EFF <http://www.eff.org> about the USA Patriot Act.

Excerpted from EFFector    Vol. 17, No. 5       February 25, 2004  
donna@eff.org A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation  ISSN
1062-9424 In the 281st Issue of EFFector:

* Let the Sun Set on PATRIOT - Section 206: "Roving Surveillance Authority
Under the Foreign Intelligence  Surveillance Act of 1978"

Welcome to part two of "Let the Sun Set on PATRIOT," an EFFector  series on
the battle to let some of the most troubling provisions  in the USA PATRIOT
Act expire, or "sunset."  Each week, we profile  one of the 13 provisions set
to expire in December of 2005 and  explain in plain language what's wrong with
the provision and why  Congress should allow it to sunset.  This week we look
at  section 206, which allows the FBI to conduct "John Doe" roving 
surveillance.

Imagine that the FBI could, with a single search warrant, raid  every house or
office that an individual suspect has visited over  an entire year - every
single place, whether or not the  residents themselves are suspects.  Suppose
that the FBI could  do this without ever having to identify the suspect in
question.   This is what Section 206 allows in the communications context.

Section 206 authorizes intelligence investigators to conduct  "John Doe"
roving surveillance - meaning that the FBI can  wiretap every single phone
line, mobile communications device  or Internet connection that a suspect
might be using, without  ever having to identify the suspect by name.   This
gives the  FBI a "blank check" to violate the communications privacy of 
countless innocent Americans.  What's worse, these blank-check  wiretap orders
can remain in effect for up to a year.

Section 206 amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act  (FISA) so that
a wiretap order issued by the secret FISA court  no longer has to specify what
type of communications that the  order applies to.  This allows investigators
to engage in  "roving" surveillance, using a single wiretap order to listen 
in on any phone line or monitor any Internet account that a  suspect may be
using - whether or not other people who are not  suspects also regularly use
it.

Roving wiretaps are allowed in regular criminal investigations,  so it might
seem reasonable that the PATRIOT Act made them  available to intelligence
investigators.  But FISA wiretaps lack  many of the safeguards that prevent
abuse of criminal wiretaps.   For example, orders are issued using a lower
legal standard than  the "probable cause" used in criminal cases, are subject
to  substantially less judicial oversight and typically last at least  three
times longer than criminal wiretaps.  Surveillance targets  are never notified
that they were spied on.  Most important, and  also unlike criminal wiretaps,
the FISA court can issue "John  Doe" wiretaps that don't even specify the
surveillance target's  name.  

The bottom line: further relaxing controls on FISA surveillance  by adding
roving capability is a recipe for abuse and likely  violates the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that search warrants  "particularly describ[e] the
place to be searched, and the  persons or things to be seized."

EFF strongly opposes renewal of Section 206, and urges you to  do the same. 
We also support the Security and Freedom Ensured  Act (SAFE Act, S 1709/HR
3352), a PATRIOT reform bill that would,  among other things, limit the damage
done to privacy by Section  206 - it would allow the FBI to get roving
wiretaps on identified  suspects, and John Doe taps on specific phone lines
and Internet  accounts, but not John Doe roving taps.   We encourage you to 
visit EFF's Action Center today to let your representatives know  you support
the bill: <http://action.eff.org/action/index.asp?step=2&item=2866>

We'll look at Section 207, which extends the period of time that  FISA
wiretaps can last.