From: APFN <APFN@apfn.org>
To: 911 communications <afelzenberg@9-11commission.gov>, 911 review
<apfn@911review.org>, APFN Yahoogroups <apfn-1@yahoogroups.com>, APFN
SMARTGROUP <apfn@smartgroups.com>
Subject: U.S. intelligence received Randy Glass's pre-9/11 warnings
Date: Fri, Jan 30, 2004, 9:50 pm


cooperativeresearch.org <mailto:list@cooperativeresearch.org>
U.S. intelligence received Randy Glass's pre-9/11 warnings
Fri Jan 30 17:22:30 2004
http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?disc=149495;article=49321;title=APFN

Additionally, we have obtained a video proving that U.S. intelligence
received Randy Glass's pre-9/11 warnings of terrorist attacks against the
U.S.

A fascinating video relating to an important unheeded warning of the 9/11
attacks was shown on WPTV, an NBC TV station in Florida on October 7, 2002.
This video has been overlooked and forgotten until now.
See the video now
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/main/Glass-Graham.html

NOTES ON THE LATEST TIMELINE UPDATE

The 9/11 Timeline is finally being updated after far too many months. A move
to New Zealand and other activities have kept me busy, but now we're back
and better than ever. We are currently in the middle of importing the
timeline into a database. It will still look the same, but give you the user
much greater ability and flexibility to search through it.

That should be coming within weeks, as well as a fix to all the broken
external article links. There will also be many more updates soon to cover
all of the news in the past months. In the meantime, this update focuses on
the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry's report from May 2003. The most important
information coming out of that in my opinion has to do with the revelation
that the hijackers had many associates while living in the US. The FBI and
CIA had previously adamantly claimed the hijackers were "loners" with no
associates in the US whatsoever. It turns out that many of these associates
were already under investigation by the FBI, and that quite a few have ties
with the Saudi Arabian government.

This update is divided into three thematic parts. (Since this is a mix of
new and updated entries, new entries are marked "NEW" at the beginning.) For
the sections on the Phoenix Memo and hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid
Almihdhar, nearly every single entry relating to these topics has been
updated, so reading this will give you the complete stories. For the other
section on associates of the hijackers in Germany, these entries are but a
small part of that story. But for all three sections, we learn the many
failures to stop the hijackers were much worse than previously reported.

These new entries have been inputted into the chronologically organized
timeline pages but not the other thematic sections of the timeline, because
all of those pages will be changing significantly when our new database
system goes into effect.

THE PHOENIX MEMO

NEW 1994 (C): The Phoenix FBI office uncovers startling evidence connecting
Arizona to radical Muslim terrorists. The office videotapes two men trying
to recruit a Phoenix FBI informant to be a suicide bomber. One of the men is
linked to terrorist leader Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see July 1990). [Los
Angeles Times, 5/26/02, New York Times, 6/19/02] In 1998, the office's
international terrorism squad investigates a possible Middle Eastern
extremist taking flight lessons at a Phoenix airport. By 1990, Arizona has
become one of the main centers in the US for radical Muslims and remains so.
But terrorism remains a low priority for the office. Meanwhile, hijacker
Hani Hanjour moves to Arizona for the first time around 1990 (see 1990) and
spends much of the next decade in the state. The FBI apparently remains
oblivious about Hanjour, though one FBI informant claims that by 1998 they
"knew everything about the guy" (see 1998 (F)). [New York Times, 6/19/02]
FBI agent Ken Williams later investigates the possibility of terrorists
learning to fly aircraft (see April 17, 2000 and July 10, 2001), but he has
no easy way to query a central FBI database about similar cases. As a result
of this and other FBI communication problems, he remains unaware of most US
intelligence reports about the potential use of airplanes as weapons, as
well as other, specific FBI warnings about terrorists training at US flight
schools (see May 18, 1998, After May 15, 1998, 1999 (L), and September 1999
(E)). [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]

NEW 1997-July 2001: Hijacker Hani Hanjour begins associating with an unnamed
individual who is later mentioned in FBI agent Ken Williams' famous flight
school memo (see July 10, 2001). Hanjour and this person train at flight
schools in Arizona. Several flight instructors later note the two were
associates and may have carpooled together. They are known to share the same
airplane on one occasion in 1999, and are at the school together on other
occasions. This individual leaves the US in April 2000. In May 2001, the FBI
attempts to investigate this person, but after finding out the person is out
of the country the decision is made to not open a formal investigation. The
name of this person is not placed on a watch list, so the FBI is unaware
that the person returns in June and stays in the US for another month. By
this time, this person is an experienced flight instructor who is certified
to fly Boeing 737s. The FBI speculates the person may return to evaluate
Hanjour's flying skills or provide final training before 9/11. There is
considerable circumstantial evidence placing this person near Hanjour during
this month. [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]

1998 (F):An American Muslim named Aukai Collins later says he reports to the
FBI about hijacker Hani Hanjour for six months this year. [AP, 5/24/02] The
FBI later acknowledges they paid Collins to monitor the Islamic and Arab
communities in Phoenix between 1996 and 1999. [AP, 5/24/02, ABC News,
5/23/02] Collins claims that he is a casual acquaintance of hijacker Hani
Hanjour while Hanjour is taking flying lessons.[AP, 5/24/02] Collins sees
nothing suspicious about Hanjour as an individual, but he tells the FBI
about him because Hanjour appears to be part of a larger, organized group of
Arabs taking flying lessons. [Fox News, 5/24/02] He says the FBI "knew
everything about the guy," including his exact address, phone number and
even what car he drove. The FBI denies Collins told them anything about
Hanjour, and denies knowing about Hanjour before 9/11.[ABC News, 5/23/02]
Collins later calls Hanjour a "hanky panky" hijacker: "He wasn't even
moderately religious, let alone fanatically religious. And I knew for a fact
that he wasn't part of al-Qaeda or any other Islamic organization; he
couldn't even spell jihad in Arabic." [My Jihad: The True Story of an
American Mujahid's Amazing Journey from Usama Bin Laden's Training Camps to
Counterterrorism with the FBI and CIA, Aukai Collins, 6/02, p. 248]

May 18, 1998: An FBI pilot sends his supervisor in the Oklahoma City FBI
office a memo warning that he has observed "large numbers of Middle Eastern
males receiving flight training at Oklahoma airports in recent months." The
memo, titled "Weapons of Mass Destruction," further states this "may be
related to planned terrorist activity" and speculates that "light planes
would be an ideal means of spreading chemicals or biological agents." The
memo doesn't call for an investigation, and none is done. [Congressional
Inquiry, 7/24/03 (, NewsOK, 5/29/02, see the memo here] The memo is "sent
to the bureau's Weapons of Mass Destruction unit and forgotten." [New York
Daily News, 9/25/02] In 1999 it is learned that an al-Qaeda agent had
studied flight training in Norman, Oklahoma (see September 1999 (E)).
Hijackers Atta and Marwan Alshehhi briefly visit the same school in 2000;
Zacarias Moussaoui does study at the school in 2001 (see February 23, 2001
and August 23, 2001 (E)).

After May 15, 1998: At some point in 1998 after an Oklahoma City FBI office
warning about possible terrorists training at US flight schools (see May 18,
1998), the FBI receives reports that a terrorist organization might be
planning to bring students to the US for flight training. [New York Daily
News, 9/25/02] The FBI is aware that people connected to this unnamed
organization had performed surveillance and security tests at airports in
the US and had made comments suggesting an intention to target civil
aviation. Apparently this warning is not shared with other FBI offices or
the FAA, and a connection with the Oklahoma warning is not made; a similar
warning follows in 1999 (see 1999 (L)). [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03 (]

1999 (L): The FBI receive reports that a terrorist organization is planning
to send students to the US for aviation training. The organization's name
remains classified, but apparently it is a different organization than one
mentioned in a very similar warning the year before (see After May 15,
1998). The purpose of this training is unknown, but the organization views
the plan as "particularly important" and has reportedly approved open-ended
funding for it. The Counterterrorism Section at FBI headquarters instructs
24 field offices to pay close attention to Islamic students from the target
country engaged in aviation training. Ken Williams at the Phoenix FBI office
will later write a memo on this very topic (see July 10, 2001), and his
squad receives this notice. Williams, however, doesn't recall reading it.
The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry later concludes, "There is no indication that
field offices conducted any investigation after receiving the
communication." [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03 (] However, an analyst at
FBI headquarters conducts a study and determines that each year there are
about 600 Middle Eastern students attending the slightly over 1,000 US
flight schools. [New York Times, 5/4/02, Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03 (]
In November 2000 a notice is sent out telling field offices that no
information about the terrorist group recruiting students had been
uncovered. Apparently Williams doesn't see this notice either.
[Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03 (]

September 1999 (E): Agents from Oklahoma City FBI office visit the Airman
Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma to investigate Ihab Ali, who has already
been identified as bin Laden's former personal pilot. Ali attended the
school in 1993 and is later named as an unindicted coconspirator in the 1998
US Embassy bombing in Kenya. [CNN, 10/16/01, Boston Globe, 9/18/01, Senate
Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] When Ali was arrested in May 1999, he was
working as a taxi driver in Orlando, Florida. Investigators discover recent
ties between him and high ranking al-Qaeda leaders, and suspect he was a
"sleeper" agent. [St. Petersburg Times, 10/28/01] However, the agent
visiting the school is not given most background details about him.
[Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03 (] it's not known if these investigators
are aware of a terrorist flight school warning given by the Oklahoma City
FBI office in 1998 (see May 18, 1998). Hijackers Atta and Marwan Alshehhi
later visit the Airman school in July 2000 but ultimately decide to train in
Florida instead. [Boston Globe, 9/18/01] Al-Qaeda agent Zacarias Moussaoui
takes flight lessons at Airman in 2001 (see February 23, 2001). One of the
FBI agents sent to visit the school at this time visits it again in August
2001 asking about Moussaoui, but he fails to make a connection between the
two visits (see August 23, 2001 (E)).

April 17, 2000: Arizona FBI agent Ken Williams, who later becomes famous for
writing a memo correctly diagnosing al-Qaeda's use of US flight schools to
train hijackers (see July 10, 2001), gets a tip that makes him suspicious
that some flight students might be terrorists. [New York Times, 6/19/02] It
appears that flight school student Zacaria Sourba is seen at a shooting
range with a known jihad veteran. [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/01 (C)] On this
day, he starts a formal investigation into Sourba. [Arizona Republic,
7/24/03] Sourba is the main focus of Williams' later memo. But Williams'
work is greatly slowed because of internal politics and personal disputes.
When he finally returns to this case in December 2000, he and all the other
agents on the international-terrorism squad are diverted to work on a
high-profile arson case. Says James Hauswirth, another Arizona agent,
"[Williams] fought it. Why take your best terrorism investigator and put him
on an arson case? He didn't have a choice." The arson case is finally solved
in June 2001 and Williams once again returns to the issue of terrorist
flight school students. His memo comes out one month later instead of some
time in 2000. Hauswirth writes a letter to FBI Director Mueller in late
2001, complaining, "[Terrorism] has always been the lowest priority in the
division; it still is the lowest priority in the division." Others concur
that terrorism cases were a low priority in the Arizona FBI. [Los Angeles
Times, 5/26/02, New York Times, 6/19/02]

January-February 2001: NOTE: was January 2001: In January, the Arizona
flight school JetTech alerts the FAA about hijacker Hani Hanjour. No one at
the school suspects Hanjour of terrorist intent, but they tell the FAA he
lacks both the English and flying skills necessary for the commercial
pilot's license he has. The flight school manager: "I couldn't believe he
had a commercial license of any kind with the skills that he had." A former
employee says, "I'm still to this day amazed that he could have flown into
the Pentagon. He could not fly at all." They also note he is an
exceptionally poor student who doesn't seem to care about passing his
courses. [New York Times, 5/4/02 (] An FAA official named John Anthony
actually sits next to Hanjour in class and observes his skills. He suggests
the use of a translator to help Hanjour pass, but the flight school points
out that that goes "against the rules that require a pilot to be able to
write and speak English fluently before they even get their license." [AP,
5/10/02] The FAA verifies that Hanjour's pilot's license is legitimate, but
takes no other action. But since 9/11, the FBI appears to have questions
about how Hanjour got his license in 1999. They have questioned and
polygraphed the Arab American instructor who signed off on his flying
skills. [CBS, 5/10/02] His license also in fact had already expired in late
1999. [AP, 9/15/01 (] In February, Hanjour begins advanced simulator
training, "a far more complicated task than he had faced in earning a
commercial license." [New York Times, 6/19/02] The flight school again
alerts the FAA about this and gives a total of five alerts about Hanjour,
but no further action on him is taken. The FBI is not told about Hanjour.
[CBS, 5/10/02] Ironically, a few months later, Arizona FBI agent Ken
Williams recommends in a memo that the FBI liaison with local flight schools
and keep track of suspicious activity by Middle Eastern students (see July
10, 2001).

February 23, 2001: Al-Qaeda agent Zacarias Moussaoui flies to the US. Three
days later he starts flight training at the Airman Flight School in Norman,
Oklahoma. The school and the area had a history of training terrorist pilots
(see May 18, 1998 and September 1999 (E)). He trains there until May, but
doesn't do well and drops out before getting a pilot's license. His visa
expires on May 22, but he doesn't attempt to renew it or get another one. He
stays in Norman, making arrangements to change flight schools, and
frequently exercising in a gym. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02,
MSNBC, 12/11/01] According to US investigators, would-be hijacker Ramzi bin
al-Shibh (see November 20, 2002) later says he meets Moussaoui in Karachi
(Pakistan) in June 2001. [Washington Post, 11/20/02] Moussaoui moves to a
flight school in Minnesota in August (see August 13-15, 2001) and is
arrested by the FBI a short time later (see August 15, 2001). [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02, MSNBC, 12/11/01]
MUCH MORE HERE:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/updates/update18.html

=============================
Frontline: Chasing the Sleeper Cell
<http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?disc=149495;article=49293;title=APFN>
APFN, Fri Jan 30 01:01

Maybe you just post the link to the conspiracy theory list server?